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BOOK REVIEW
JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE ART OF BIOGRAPHY
THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, by Liva Baker.* New York: HarperCollins
1991. Pp. 643. $29.95
SHELDON M. NOVICK**
The difficulty about biography is that no one sees a life as a
whole except the person who lives it. The biographer therefore
must make a choice-to penetrate that private reality and write
a book that gives some sense of the life as it was lived, or to
write some other sort of book, a commentary from the outside.
To gain a true sense of a life as it was lived is not always
possible. The data may not be there; the world in which the life
was lived, the context that gave it meaning, may have vanished
beyond recall. But when the critical details of ordinary life can
be reconstructed, there is a sensibility, almost a separate sense,
that one may use to understand the subjective existence of
another person. We use this sensibility to understand, almost
without speech, people we care for, and so writing a life is a
little like falling in love. One need not like or even admire the
subject of a life, but one must be able to use this particular
sensibility.
Holmes lived intensely, and seen inwardly, two strong impulses
dominated his life. The first was the kind of limitless ambition
that is born of violent rivalry: he wanted not to be good, but to
be best. Even sexual passion was for him a mode of achievement,
and his thought was fundamentally combative. He wished, in-
tensely, to be remembered as the greatest legal thinker who had
ever lived -sometimes he omitted the qualifying "legal." At times
he seemed to be trying to penetrate the barriers of thought
* B.A., Smith College, 1952; M.S.J., Columbia University, 1955.
** Scholar in Residence at Vermont Law School. B.A., Antioch College, 1963; J.D.,
Washington University, 1977. Sheldon M. Novick is author of HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE
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itself, to get beyond language to the wordless speech of the
absolute. His ambition was an act of faith: he wanted to find and
describe the rational foundations that he was sure lay beneath
morality and history. He had a horror of death, of dying before
he had had his chance to "outreach[ ] the flaming bounds of the
possible."'
Set against this ambition was an equally stern devotion to
duty. He felt obliged to expose himself to three years of infantry
combat in the Civil War,2 and what was perhaps more difficult,
to the humbling duties of a middle class Bostonian.3 He was
obliged to earn his living, and choosing law as the only suitable
profession, Holmes found himself enclosed by a quotidian routine
hostile to abstract thought. A lawyer's and a judge's work were
anonymous and soon forgotten. His fights were on behalf of
others. To Holmes's great credit he extracted from this unprom-
ising career in a provincial town the materials of philosophy-of
original, systematic thought of a high order. By a relentless force
of application, he managed to impress himself upon the history
of thought through the very intensity of his self-effacement.
Holmes is remembered as the champion of judicial self-restraint,
as a judge whose dispassionate objectivity was impersonal and
almost inhuman. This paradoxical reconciliation of ambition and
duty rested on a carefully constructed and deeply felt philosophy,
a complete and highly personal system of metaphysics. 4
Liva Baker has not chosen to write a life of this sort. She has
instead written a long and interesting commentary on the events
and circumstances of Holmes's career as a judge, many of which
she herself has uncovered. Such a book must have a thesis, and
Baker's is given in her title: Holmes was the representative of a
class.
I. HOLMES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF HISTORY
Baker has written other books on legal history-a youthful
biography of Felix Frankfurter5 and a mature and admirable book
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Address Delivered at a Meeting Called by the Graduating
Class of Harvard University (May 30, 1895), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM
THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. 87, 89 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
2. SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 34-
35 (1989).
3. LIvA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 15-16 (1991).
4. See Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes's Philosophy, 1992 WASH. U. L.Q. (forthcoming).
5. LIVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER (1969).
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on the Miranda§ case.7 Accordingly, although she is not a lawyer,
she is no stranger to the law, and her readings of Holmes's
opinions are often illuminating. She writes clearly and well, and
her images are sometimes striking:
An imaginary photograph album [of the Civil War] in which
he had pasted the mental pictures of fallen comrades, the
smoke of guns, men up to their knees in mud, bloodstained
blankets . . . seemed to have lain open across his lap nearly
all the time for the rest of his life.8
But there are very long stretches of clumsy exposition, as if
Baker had not always got her ideas clear before writing them
down. The language is often careless. Sometimes Baker is led
into wild statements by a weakness for strong effects. She says
that
[a]long with Jackson genes, Holmes as judge had inherited the
legal traditions of Grandfather Jackson's early-nineteenth-cen-
tury court .... [Tihe memories of that long-ago bench were
as much a part of the younger man's judicial baggage as were
the heavy leather-bound volumes that had belonged to his
grandfather.9
I am not sure what this means-surely judicial traditions are not
passed on in the germ plasm?-except that Baker wants us to
believe that Holmes was somehow influenced by his grandfather's
work as a judge. (Baker never tells us anything about that work,
by the way.) I do not believe this is true, and Baker gives no
evidence for it. So far as I know, Holmes politely avoided the
subject of his grandfather's writings, but he did often express a
general contempt for the primitive reasonings of the Massachu-
setts judges of the early nineteenth century. 10
Baker says that Holmes "examined the briefs and records of
a case for the first time during oral argument,"" but I do not
think she means to be understood literally. She knows too much
about law and courts to think that this could be possible; but
what she did mean is not clear.
Baker's account is not primarily a literary effort, however, and
to dwell on the style is perhaps unfair. Baker has written a
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983).
8. BAKER, supra note 3, at 154.
9. Id. at 280.
10. See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOwE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING
YEARS 16 (1963) (describing Holmes's criticism of Chancellor James Kent's Commentaries).
11. BAKER, supra note 3, at 382.
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treatise. About half of The Justice from Beacon Hill is devoted
to Holmes's years on the Court, and in a certain sense the whole
book is a commentary on his Supreme Court opinions. As the
opening chapter makes clear, she set herself the task of under-
standing and explaining why certain of those opinions have seemed
politically "liberal," while Holmes's thought in general, and most
of his opinions, were distinctly conservative. 12 Baker concluded
that Holmes's conservative philosophy was a product of class
prejudice, while Holmes's seemingly liberal opinions, to Baker
the valuable part of his work, she ascribed to healthy if erratic
rebellions against his upbringing:
It is not possible to reduce [Holmes's] work to any one sys-
tem .... An unarticulated but nonetheless real ambivalence
about his heritage stalked Holmes lifelong. His natural incli-
nation was to look at the world from the perspective of a
typical nineteenth-century provincial Bostonian, to apply the
standards of the genteel tradition .... Emotionally, he clung
to the introverted world his forebears had created; intellectu-
ally, he was questing, catholic, adventurous. 3
Holmes, I think, would have put it differently. He freed himself
from his provincial origins early on. He did not think Boston,
even the Boston of Beacon Hill, was especially genteel, and he
looked elsewhere for his models, notably to London and to the
literature of chivalry. 4 When he wrote a poem about his ideal of
himself, the image he chose was Sir Walter Raleigh, not Governor
Bradstreet.'5 He would have been saddened to think that his
life's intellectual work was taken for no more than a tolerant
willingness to set aside the prejudices of Beacon Hill and to let
the trade unions have their turn, as Baker seems to believe when
she writes that "[Holmes's] concept of law was based on the
principle that economic, political, and social premises-all life-
were in a constant state of flux and required matching changes
in the law, which was an expression of that life.' 16
This is not much to show for an ambition to be the greatest
legal thinker ever to have lived. I suppose the subject of a
commentary after all may not be an accurate judge of his own
12. Id. at 9-11.
13. Id. at 11-16.
14. See, e.g., NovICK, supra note 2, at 112-13.
15. Id.
16. BAKER, supra note 3, at 11.
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work. He may be unconscious of his own motives, he may be
rationalizing or lying to himself, or he may be the victim of a
"false. consciousness." The commentator fits her subject into a
framework of history of which the subject himself may not have
been aware, and claims a superior wisdom.
Baker's framework is the rise of the New Deal. The English
have "Whig history," an unflattering phrase that describes win-
ner's history. Whig history is the tale of English liberty growing
steadily with the power of Parliament. In this country, we have
no similarly understood phrase, but we have our own equivalent
pious history. It is the tale of the rise of the federal government
as the defender of civil rights, what we might call "New Deal
history."
Of course, it is easy to make fun of this sort of pietistic history,
but there is a good deal of truth in it. The federal government
can rise above regional enthusiasms, and Baker shows very well
how Holmes's detachment, his disciplined disregard of conse-
quences, occasionally made him the champion of civil rights.17
The thing can be overdone, however. Baker describes Theodore
Roosevelt as Franklin's cousin, an enthusiastic trust-buster, a
sort of early New Dealer.8 The crusty born-again federalist, John
Marshall Harlan, becomes "a premature New Dealer."' 9 What is
more worrisome is that there are only two parts in the play.
Every character must be on either the federal side-that is, a
thorough democrat, a champion of the little guy-or a plutocrat.
Baker insistently fits everyone and everything into this mold,
occasionally with silly results. The first two hundred pages of
the book are a long essay demonstrating that Holmes himself
was a "Brahmin," by which Baker means a member of the
supposed hereditary ruling class of Boston who lived on Beacon
Hill. The Justice's father, Dr. Holmes, put the term "Brahmin"
into current use, and meant by it not a ruling class, but rather
a class of genteel intellectuals, a priestly class. 20 Baker, however,
uses the word to mean a kind of economic oligarchy, whose
wealth and power had passed down from the first English set-
tlers.
17. Id. at 387-88.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 398.
20. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Bread and Newspapers, in 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 9 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1892) (complaining that critics
incorrectly think a "Brahmin" is an aristocrat).
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This business of a hereditary class on Beacon Hill sounds a
little odd today; on this topic alone Baker seems to have absorbed
the subjective view of the Victorians. As Baker herself shows,
Holmes actually came from a family of modest meais.21 His
mother's father, Charles Jackson, had inherited wealth from the
old seacoast trading towns destroyed by the War of 1812; but
none of this wealth, except the modest income from a trust, ever
reached Holmes's family.2
Largely through the royalties on his father's books, and a
saving habit, Holmes died a rich man; but he was not raised in
luxury. Holmes's father worked for a living all his life, first as a
physician, and then as a writer and lecturer.2 His father was a
minister, and his father's family, at least on the paternal side,
were Connecticut farmers, descended from Scottish dissenters.24
The Wendells were Dutch merchants and seamen; a great grand-
father was prosperous, but the fortune did not survive him. Many
forebears were less distinguished, by Boston's standards. A
grandmother was Irish, and a family tradition, which Justice
Holmes liked to repeat to jog his snottier friends, maintained
that the Wendells were originally Dutch Jews.25 The "Oliver"
commemorated by Holmes's baptismal name was a great-great-
grandmother, who in turn was connected by marriage to descen-
dants of the Bradstreets.26 The story of unbroken, distinguished
Brahmin descent from English gentry was a fantasy that Dr.
Holmes had fathered upon his fictional alter ego, the Autocrat
of the Breakfast Table.Y
This fantasy reached the status of myth in Catherine Drinker
Bowen's Yankee from Olympus.2 Written in wartime and pub-
lished in 1944, Bowen's fictionalized story of the Holmes family
was her contribution to the war effort. It turned the Holmeses
into English people and made Justice Holmes purely and simply
an expression of his genteel Volk. Baker entered wholeheartedly
into this myth, even as she recited the facts of Holmes's Scots-
21. BAKER, supra note 3, at 48.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 24-26.
25. NOVICK, supra note 2, at 318.
26. BAKER, supra note 3, at 24-25.
27. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE: EVERY
MAN His OWN BOSWELL 23-26 (Boston, Tinker & Fields, 1866).
28. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
FAMILY (1944).
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Irish and Dutch belongings. Her enthusiastic adoption of Victorian
language, her repeated references to good or bad "blood," occa-
sionally make one squirm: "The royal blue blood not only of
Olivers, Wendells, and Holmeses flowed through his veins, but
also that of Quincys, Cabots, Jacksons, Lees, Eliots, and Brad-
streets. . . [Sarah Wendell's] marriage to Abiel Holmes amal-
gamated the blood of the three families and guaranteed acceptance
of the Connecticut Holmeses into Boston's aristocracy."'
Poor old Abiel, Holmes's paternal grandfather, a rather mild
and tolerant man with a small church in then still rural Cambridge,
whose tolerance got him in trouble with both sides of his divided
congregation,30 becomes a sort of Calvinist oligarch.
In this odd way Baker gives New England a hereditary ruling
class and enrolls the Holmeses in it.
Wealth -commercial, cultural, and charitable-was consoli-
dated in the same hands, or, as one commentator put it, Boston
institutions were a self-perpetuating series of "interlocking
directorates."...
These Bostonians were as orthodox as they were clannish.
In the seventeenth century, they had accused dissenters of
witchcraft and had sent Roger Williams and his Quakers pack-
ing. They had regarded the War of 1812 as an inconvenient
interference with local shipping .... [They defended slavery
and they] supported not only as sound economics but also as
sound morals the twelve-hour day for workers in the textile
mills.
3 1
There are only two classes in Baker's scheme, the rich and the
poor, which makes the analysis much simpler. When one draws
with such broad strokes, the same "they" can be guilty of every
sin, from the witchcraft trials to the Satanic Mills of Lowell. The
good guys, of course, are the poor, the more recent immigrants,
and all oppressed minorities-who also are lumped together in a
single class.
The need to put all the good guys in one camp and the bad
guys in another leads to some absurdities. Charles Jackson's
comfortable three-story house is called a "mansion." 32 A photo-
graph of Holmes and Brandeis on the steps of the capitol is
29. BAKER, supra note 3, at 15, 27.
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id. (fourth page of photographs).
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captioned, "Holmes the Mayflower aristocrat and Brandeis the
son of immigrant Jews."' ' Holmes as we have seen was the son
of farmers and modest professionals far more than of inherited
wealth. Brandeis's parents, on the other hand, indeed were Jewish
immigrants, but they were the sort of immigrants who traveled
with servants and a grand piano. Holmes assumed aristocratic
values, and Brandeis spoke for the little guy; but both men are
diminished by the odd implication that their views were simply
class prejudices.
Every now and then Baker admits that there is a middle class,
even that there was an "intellectual" as well as mercantile
Boston,' and that her own data put Holmes into this middle
reach, this complex and inconsistent majority.35 But she ignores
her own data and clings to the Olympian myth.
It is easy to see how she and others have been misled. Holmes
was indeed an aristocrat, but an aristocrat of a very American
kind; he was a self-made aristocrat. Like his good friend Henry
James, he adopted a European standard, and without abandoning
loyalty to his middle-class origins, he became a gentleman. But
to tell this story, Holmes's own story, one would have to abandon
the whole apparatus of class conflict and the march of history
into a shining Progressive future.
II. THE DATA
Baker has read widely in primary sources and makes good use
of them. She seems to have read thousands of Holmes's manu-
script letters and all of his more than two thousand signed judicial
opinions. She gives excellent, if usually too brief, quotations from
hundreds of these documents.
But the account of Holmes's life that Baker gives is rarely
surprising; we seem to have read it all before. This is not because
she is writing a commentary; Lytton Strachey, who might be
credited with inventing this modern form of biography,36 was
nothing if not surprising. No one can think of Florence Nightingale,
Cardinal -,1nning, or Queen Victoria in quite the same way after
reading Strachey. But Baker's Holmes does not surprise. She
33. Id. (sixteenth page of photographs).
34. See, e.g., id. at 57-58.
35. See, e.g., id. at 48.
36. See LYTTON STRACHEY, QUEEN VICTORIA (1921); LYTTON STRACHEY, EMINENT VICTO-
RIANS (1918).
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gives us the Brahmin myth from The Autocrat of the Breakfast
Table and Yankee from Olympus-Beacon Hill and all that. Baker
also gives us a familiar Civil War. After three years in combat,
Baker solemnly tells us, Holmes was so traumatized that ever
after his emotions were deadened; he lacked real feeling and
viewed other human beings coldly. This is a thesis developed in
some detail by Yosal Rogat,37 Saul Touster,38 and Hiller Zobe 9
over the past thirty years, who used it to explain what they
thought was a pathological lack of compassion in Holmes's opi-
nions.
After the war, Holmes struggled for six years to form an
original philosophy from the materials of Boston law practice;
this work can be found in a series of anonymous articles written
for the American Law Review4 and incorporated in his first
synoptic work on the common law, his edition of Kent's
Commentaries.41 Baker says almost nothing about this period,
important as it was, perhaps because almost nothing has been
written about it before.
Holmes married Fanny Dixwell in 1872, and while Fanny there-
after subordinated herself to Holmes's career, Holmes for his
part gave up the life of scholarship that he had hoped to pursue,
and entered the commercial practice of law.42 Baker has little to
say about any of this, and very little to say about Fanny. The
Common Lawl was written in the years of law practice, rather
than the years of independent scholarship, which Holmes later
came to think was an advantage, but Baker does not quite catch
this point.
Holmes was freed from commercial practice by a long-sought
appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court, and Baker is gen-
erally good on his years as a Massachusetts judge. She has read
the opinions, and while she restricts herself once again to topics
that others have written on before, she marshalls her data
effectively. As she shows, Holmes continued to pursue his quasi-
37. Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CH. L. REV. 213 (1964).
38. Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes from Within, 18 VAND. L. REV. 437, 464, 470-71
(1965).
39. Hiller B. Zobel, Enlisted for Life, AM. HERITAGE, June-July 1986, at 56.
40. See NoVIcK, supra note 2, at 123-35 and accompanying citations.
41. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ed.,
12th ed., Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1896).
42. BAKER, supra note 3, at 223, 231.
43. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown and Co.,
1881).
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scientific investigations of the common law, writing his results
into the law of Massachusetts; and his Olympian detachment
began to earn him a reputation as a dangerous man.44
The bulk of Baker's book, however, is devoted to Holmes's
Washington years. He was appointed to the Supreme Court in
1902, when he was sixty-one years old; and so, at an age when
many are thinking of retirement, he and Fanny moved to Wash-
ington and began a thirty-year career. Baker tells the story of
these years well.45 She knows Washington and the Supreme Court
intimately; and the mass of detail collected in this portion of the
book is useful for anyone who wants to understand the consti-
tutional law of the first half of the twentieth century. But here
again, one is-I was- disappointed. The cases are familiar ones,
intelligently collected by Max Lerner fifty years ago,46 and de-
spite the wealth of detail, I had the sense that little was new.
She may have been right to follow Lerner's selection of cases-
it would be difficult to improve upon. But Lerner and the law
review commentators who followed him have not studied Holmes's
unpublished papers as Baker has, and so it is really disappointing
and surprising to find Baker limiting herself to what others have
said.
The prime example, perhaps, is Holmes's First Amendment
opinions, to which Baker quite properly devotes the larger part
of two chapters. 47 These are certainly the most important of
Holmes's opinions, as expressions of his mature constitutional
jurisprudence and in their impact on modern law. Yet there is
hardly a word in Baker's account that is not based on previously
published material; indeed, with little change she gives Gerald
Gunther's well known history,48 with some additions by later
commentators.
There were two sets of Holmes's opinions on freedom of speech.
In a series of opinions written for a unanimous Court in the
spring of 1919, Holmes upheld criminal convictions of a group of
Socialists who had spoken or written against the draft. The first
of these opinions, Schenck v. United States,49 stated the famous
44. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 3, at 335 (describing the apprehension of "Boston
gentlemen" at Holmes's decisions in labor disputes).
45. Id. at 339-635.
46. MAX LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES (1943).
47. BAKER, supra note 3, at 511-47.
48. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975).
49. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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doctrine that speech may be punished when it poses a "clear and
present danger," ° the First Amendment notwithstanding.
In a second group of cases, beginning with Abrams v. United
States,51 in the fall of 1919, the Court again affirmed convictions
of wartime dissidents, but Holmes dissented in these cases,
writing a series of powerful dissenting opinions (in which Brandeis
alone concurred) that are now often cited as authoritative pre-
cedent.
The two sets of opinions have a markedly different quality and
spirit. Schenck is ritually cited by prosecutors, while Abrams is
the most eloquent statement of the principle of free speech in
American jurisprudence.
Commentators have had some trouble reconciling the two sets
of opinions, and in recent years a "revisionist" account has grown
popular. Holmes, in this view, did not feel very strongly about
freedom of speech and wrote Schenck without much reflection.
In the summer of 1919, after Schenck was announced, the argu-
ment goes, some young friends, notably Judge Learned Hand,
persuaded him to change his position. Professor Gerald Gunther
has been the leading advocate of this view,52 which Baker re-
peats.5 She adds some embellishments, but only those that other
commentators have suggested: for instance, she suggests Bran-
deis helped change Holmes's mind,4 a theory that is oddly rem-
iniscent of the gossip of the day that Holmes was in thrall to
Brandeis's Hebraic wiles.
Gunther's account has the advantage of squaring with Baker's
overall thesis, and vice versa. The revisionist version gives us
an initially unreflective, conservative Holmes, who eventually
rises a little above himself, with some help from his Progressive
friends.
This is not the place to review the huge literature on Holmes's
First Amendment opinions. Baker gives the consensus view. But,
surely it is surprising, indeed almost incredible, that a judge of
Holmes's experience, who had already written a series of opinions
for a unanimous Court, should change his mind about a funda-
mental question after casual conversations with men forty years
his junior.
50. Id. at 52.
51. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
52. See Gunther, supra note 48.
53. BAKER, supra note 3, at 514-24.
54. Id. at 522, 526-27.
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Holmes already had complained about such misunderstandings
in his lifetime, and in private letters (which Baker does not
quote), he strenuously denied them. As evidence that his views
had not changed between Schenck and Abrams, Holmes referred
to an unpublished dissent that he had written before any of the
other cases were decided, in which he spoke as strongly for
freedom of speech as he ever did.55
What is striking about Baker's account is that, although she
adds some new quotations from Learned Hand's papers,6 and
some details she attributes to a personal communication from
Gerald Gunther, who is Hand's biographer,5 7 on this topic she
seems not to have looked into Holmes's papers at all. She does
not refer to his letters of this time, and she certainly does not
refer to the suppressed dissent.
As it happens, however, Holmes kept a copy of the dissent,
with notes showing the circumstances. The case was Baltzer v.
United States.5 The defendant had been convicted of attempting
to obstruct the draft by writing letters to public officials, and
evidently the full Court had voted to affirm.59 On December 3,
1918, several weeks before Schenck was argued, Holmes circulated
a memorandum to the other Justices which he proposed to publish
as a dissent:
Real obstructions of the law, giving real aid and comfort to
the enemy, I should have been glad to see punished more
summarily and severely than they sometimes were. But I think
that our intention to put out all our powers in aid of success
in war should not hurry us into intolerance of opinions and
speech that could not be imagined to do harm, although opposed
to our own. It is better for those who have unquestioned and
almost unlimited power in their hands to err on the side of
freedom. We have enjoyed so much freedom for so long that
perhaps we are in danger of forgetting that the bill of rights
which cost so much blood to establish still is worth fighting
for, and that no tittle of it should be abridged.60
55. NOVICK, supra note 2, at 474 (citing Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Alice
Stopford Green (March 26, 1919) (on file at Holmes Papers, Harvard Law School Library)).
56. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 3, at 739 (citing letter from Learned Hand to Oliver
Wendell Holmes (June 22, 1918) (on file at Hand Papers, Harvard Law School Library)).
57. Id. (citing Letter from Gerald Gunther to Liva Baker (Aug. 21, 1989)).
58. 248 U.S. 593 (1918) (order reversing and remanding the case on motion of the
Solicitor General).
59. Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1992 Sup.
CT. REV., App. A (forthcoming).
60. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, Harvard Law School Library. The full text of
this dissent will be published in Novick, supra note 59.
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Holmes's dissent was so disturbing in its attack on the major-
ity, at a time when they feared growing civil unrest, that Chief
Justice Edward Douglass White asked the Court to delay issuing
any decision; and the Justice Department, apparently having
learned of the dissent-perhaps from the Chief Justice or Brandeis,
who was close to President Wilson- confessed error and with-
drew.61 The following month, White assigned the opinion in Schenck
to Holmes, in the hope of securing a unanimous Court, albeit a
more moderate one.62
Nothing in the Baltzer dissent is inconsistent with Holmes's
opinion in Schenck, but it certainly casts doubt on Gunther's
revisionist story. Holmes's strongly held views on the First
Amendment had prompted him to write a dramatic dissent well
before the Schenck cases were argued, and Holmes, by the strength
of his views, moved the Court a long way toward his own position
in Scheik-a position he had first stated in Baltzer, and then
restated so passionately in Abrams, when the Court again went
farther than he was willing to go.
There are other difficulties, from a biographer's point of view,
with the Gunther version. What is important here, however, is
not the correctness of the story Baker tells but what seems to
me a characteristic failing in her book, and perhaps of her method
generally. Baker has not really based her account on the primary
data-Holmes's letters and opinions-but on apparently author-
itative accounts in the law reviews.
Baker is highly respectful of authority, and there is hardly a
Holmes chestnut that does not get into her pages, so long as it
has been sanctified by print. Alexander Woollcott's amusing
stories6 are certainly made up-by him or by his apparent source
Harold Laski. Woollcott never knew the Holmeses, but he quotes
verbatim conversations between them on intimate topics. Baker
quotes such stories without comment.64 Laski, who was a friend
of Holmes, was also a famous romancer, and he too made up
stories about Holmes that Baker uses freely.65
Most of the anecdotes are harmless and entertaining-like
Laski's story that after Holmes's nationally broadcast radio ad-
61. See Baltzer, 248 U.S. 593; Novick, supra note 59.
62. See NovicK, supra note 2, at 474 (citing Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Alice Stopford Green, supra note 55).
63. Baker cites ALEXANDER WooLLcoTT, LONG, LONG AGO (1943); Alexander Woollcott,
The Second Hunt After the Captain, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1942, at 48; Alexander
Woollcott, "Get Down, You Fool," 161 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 169 (1938).
64. BAKER, supra note 3, at 136, 151.
65. Id. at 133.
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dress on his ninetieth birthday, he said (to Laski alone, when no
one else was present), "I wish that my father could have listened
tonight for only two or three minutes. Then I could have thumbed
my nose at him."66
Baker repeats the silly rumor that Holmes was impotent,6 7 a
whisper we had all heard but to which no scholar had attended
before. Sexual gossip seems to surround all prominent people.
The source of this particular rumor, John T. Morse, told other
remarkably bitter and improbable tales, often gingered up with
the most extraordinary antisemitism, only after Holmes was dead;
but Baker, quoting Morse, ruminates on the unconfirmed rumor
for pages.68 She does not evaluate the source, nor does she really
look at the evidence. Quite aside from Holmes's perfectly ordi-
nary, if not always admirable, behavior toward women, there are
his wife Fanny's surviving letters. Fanny expressed intense jeal-
ousy of Holmes's jaunts to New York to see other women, and
reminded Holmes that he had a wife "once a week" at home in
Boston.69 This cannot really be misunderstood.
Baker has pegged Holmes as a rather cool and even patholog-
ically detached character, so she ignores contrary evidence or
fails to ask questions when she should. She seems not to be
aware that Holmes and Fanny raised an orphaned niece, Dorothy
Upham, from childhood. 70 In several surviving letters, Holmes
talked about the apartment he and Fanny had built for her in
their Washington house, 71 and he and Fanny talked about
Dorothy's education, marriage, and childbirth; so it is hard to
see why Baker missed this relationship.
Baker seems not to be aware that Fanny herself came down
with a serious chronic illness, rheumatic fever, shortly after her
marriage, and was physically ill for years thereafter, so that
Holmes spent much of his adult life tied by affection and duty
to a semi-invalid. Letters referring to this illness were first
published in 1989,72 two years before Baker's book appeared.
Nor does Baker miss only evidence of emotional warmth and
health. She also fails to note bleak, sometimes appalling, evidence.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 228-30.
68. Id.
69. NOVICK, supra note 2, at 264.
70. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Clara Stevens (March 6, 1908) (on file at
Holmes Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
71. Id.
72. See NOVICK, supra note 2, at 133.
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Previous biographers have foundered on the difficulty of coming
to terms with or even making any sense of Holmes's blackest
moods. He seems to have believed in a particularly brutal sort
of Malthusianism. Holmes opposed any private or government
efforts to alleviate the lot of the poor and frequently remarked
that the discoveries of "scientific" anthropology suggested to him
that capital punishment should be employed more widely.73 Re-
lentlessly logical, he often repeated his view that when science
had advanced far enough it would be possible to execute-
instantly and painlessly-infants with undesirable traits.7 4
Not just the highlights, therefore, but also the shadows are
missing from Baker's book. Her Holmes is a rather mild bird; a
stodgy Beacon Hill intellectual, with an independent streak, in-
teresting but not remarkable.
Baker seems ill at ease when required to make a judgment of
her own, based on the evidence, and nearly always ends by
deferring to authority. She does not look for contrary evidence
and seems uncomfortable when she finds it. The Holmes she
presents is the Holmes familiar to readers of the law reviews.
A commentary may be a valuable addition to our literature.
The dense and compact masses of life as it is lived are hard to
handle. They can be dissected at leisure in commentaries, and
all sorts of lessons may be learned from the skeletons and
stomach contents. But one must begin with data, with the facts
of the life itself. A commentary in the air, so to speak, is a
dangerous thing, for it misleads. It is filled with citations and
quotations of living voices, but one is hearing only the echoes of
a distant lecture room.
HI. HOLMES'S REPUTATION
I should think that the first topic for a commentary would be
the question of Holmes's remarkable and growing fame. On what,
exactly, is it based?
His reputation as judge and scholar is unique. A recent study
showed that more than fifty years after his death, law reviews
still mentioned Holmes more than any other judge (except living
Supreme Court Justices).7" References to his name show only a
73. See Novick, supra note 4.
74. Id.
75. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 76 (1990). Table I shows the
number of times judges' names are mentioned in law reviews in the Lexis database
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part of Holmes's presence. Holmes's opinions have entered not
just legal literature but the fabric of legal language. A search in
April, 1992, found the phrase "clear and present danger" in nearly
nine hundred opinions in the federal courts alone since 1919.76
Holmes's images, of the "marketplace of ideas,' 77 of no "limit but
the sky,"78 of "shouting 'fire!' in a theater,"79 and of the "penum-
bra" cast by provisions of the Constitution,80 are all equally
pervasive.8 1
One of the oddities of Baker's biography is that it does not
give us any hint of why this should be so. She finds it remarkable
in a man of his class to have been tolerant of radical views, and
so it was; but surely that does not account for his impact on
lawyers, on judges, and on the law. Holmes's ideas on constitu-
tional law were very similar to Chief Justice Melville Fuller's;
indeed, that is one of the reasons Fuller assigned so many
opinions to Holmes. But Fuller, although he was Chief Justice,
is all but forgotten, while Holmes's reputation continues to grow.
The mystery is greater because Holmes's continuing reputation
does not depend on the high regard of academic professionals,
the law review writers who might be assumed to value his
openness of mind. Frequent citations of his name by law profes-
sors do not necessarily indicate a high regard. Although profes-
sors praised Holmes during his lifetime, at least since the 1940's,
many of the articles on Holmes were attacks on his reputation,
and for at least the last twenty years more law review articles
have been negative than positive. One reason may be that Holmes
did not cultivate the professors, and, except for a rare mention
of his friend John Chipman Gray, he did not cite their articles
in his opinions as Brandeis and Cardozo did. When the details of
his life began to appear in the 1940's, it quickly became known
between 1982 and 1989. Id. Holmes is listed third, after Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Brennan, then just completing his career. (If Posner had included his own name
in the rankings, however, his name would have appeared above Holmes's.) Judge Posner
makes various adjustments in Tables II and III to take account of names that are also
common words (Black) or otherwise used (Brandeis University), that do not seem relevant
to the first three names on the list, but which he applied to all the names. Id. at 76-77.
On all three lists, Holmes is in the first half dozen and is still ranked with the living.
76. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file (Apr. 16, 1992).
77. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
78. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
79. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918).
80. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 569 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. They also have their own subliterature of commentary. See, e.g., Burr Henly,
"Penumbra": The Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987).
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that he had resigned a professorship at Harvard after only half
a term, without stopping to say goodbye, that he had advised
Felix Frankfurter to resign from teaching in favor of a judgeship,
and that in public addresses he had referred contemptuously to
professors who fostered intellectual ability "at the expense of
their total life". 2 "But after all the place for a man who is
complete in all his powers is in the fight. The professor, the man
of letters, gives up one-half of life that his protected talent may
grow and flower in peace."83
This was not calculated to endear Holmes to the gatekeepers
of reputation. Furthermore, his conservative political views have
long been out of fashion in the academy, and his most important
opinions, those on freedom of speech, have been offensive to
many professors since the 1960's, as they did not give a clearly
favored position to expressive behavior. Law students today, in
their three years of law school, read only two or three of his
opinions (and perhaps an excerpt from The Common Law in torts
class), and, except for Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York,84
these are unfavorably contrasted with opinions by other judges.
His essays and addresses have long been out of print.
Yet Holmes's name is better known to the general public than,
I would venture, that of any other judge. His face adorns a
postage stamp, and his reputation is very high among practicing
lawyers and judges. For the American lawyer, "he is the beau
ideal, and the lawyer quotes his aphorisms as the literate layman
quotes Hamlet."8' One cannot read very far in any area of law
without encountering Holmes or his writings. Even his severe
critics count him as the single most influential legal writerj and
rate The Common Law as "the most important book on law ever
written by an American." 87 His admirers called him the greatest
judge in the English-speaking world.88 His stature shows no signs
82. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, George Otis Shattuck, in SPEECHES 70, 73 (1913).
83. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,
452 (1899).
84. 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
85. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, Law, Science, and Humanism, in THE HUMANIST
FRAME 329, 331 (Julian Huxley ed., 1961), quoted in Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A
Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 5 n.7 (1962).
86. "Holmes's name is uniquely weighty. To describe his commanding stature and
influence apparently requires language both oracular and portentous." Rogat, supra note
85, at 4-5.
87. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1205, 1267 (1983); Rogat, supra note 37, at 214.
88. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OP MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS
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of lessening and evidently does not depend on scholarly appraisal.
It is a popular reputation, and so one must account for this
Anglicized man of elitist tastes and inaccessible thoughts having
become America's "first citizen,"'8 9 a major public figure, rivalled
in his sphere only by Chief Justice John Marshall. Holmes held
no position of power and worked no great changes in American
institutions. Alone among American national heroes, he is cele-
brated for his intellectual achievements.
Holmes's extrajudicial writings plainly have very little to do
with his modern reputation. The Common Law, because of the
obscurity of its argument, was nearly forgotten in his lifetime,
and would be entirely forgotten now, I venture to say-the
overheated praise and blame that Holmes seems to prompt not-
withstanding-if it were not for his celebrity as a judge. The
book itself now has little reputation of its own, except as a
seminal work in the law of torts'
Nor is Holmes's work on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court very well known. The obscurity of his opinions in his first
twenty years as a judge is partly owing to the narrowness of
questions dealt with in a state court, and partly to the difficulty
of retrieving, by author, state court opinions published before
1890.90 But Holmes had not yet hit his stride in those years-
most of the opinions we now quote, remarkably, were written
after Holmes passed his seventieth year. His careful adherence
to precedent, his reluctance to innovate, deprived most of Holmes's
Massachusetts opinions of anything very distinctive, except a
highly individual style of expression; only when one follows the
line of his thought through a sequence of cases can one see his
ideas at work. He did not, like Cardozo or Hand, write "leading
cases."
Nor was he a public man, outside his work. He did not usually
give interviews, and after he joined the Supreme Court, with
241 (1957); of. Benjamin Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 691 (1931)
("the great overlord of the law and its philosophy"). A page of such effusions was collected
by Yosal Rogat in Rogat, supra note 85, at 4 n.4 (such as "he is the summit of hundreds
of years of civilization, the inspiration of ages yet to come").
89. From an anonymous sketch of Holmes on his retirement in 1932, reprinted in
VANITY FAIR: SELECTIONS FROM AMERICA'S MOST MEMORABLE MAGAZINE (Cleveland Amory
& Frederic Bradlee eds., 1960); see also K.N. Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 485,
490 (1935) ("America's most distinguished citizen").
90. The Lexis and Westlaw state databases begin with cases decided in 1890. West
Publishing Company's Northeastern Reporter begins with cases decided in 1885.
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rare exceptions, he refused all invitations to speak9' or write
outside the courtroom. He did not cultivate reporters or give
anonymous assessments of the work of the Court, as some of his
colleagues have always done. He declined all but one invitation
to speak on the radio.92
We therefore must turn to Holmes's work as a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States to understand his celebrity
and his place in history. His reputation-and the fact that many
of his later opinions are still important in widely scattered areas
of law-plainly owes a great deal to chance. He was appointed
to the Supreme Court on the strength of a personal acquaintance
and an affinity of political views with Theodore Roosevelt.93 The
assassination of President McKinley, which made Roosevelt pres-
ident just as the "Massachusetts" seat on the Court fell vacant,
was critical. Even the timing was fortunate. By Roosevelt's
second term, Holmes would have been too old.
Holmes's success on the Court also owes something to the
good luck of his longevity and his steadying presence there during
the turmoil of the 1920's. Baker rightly credits Holmes's detach-
ment as an important factor at a time when the Court had
become strongly partisan.9 4 His success also owes something to
his knack for getting along with Chief Justices and his immense
appetite for work, which together account for an unusually large
number of cases having been assigned to him to write. He wrote
873 opinions for the Court, more than any other Justice, even
including those with longer tenures. 95 This is a remarkable ac-
complishment. Modern Justices, with staffs of four clerks each,
write separate concurring or dissenting opinions in nearly all
major cases but do not write so many opinions for themselves
as Holmes did for the Court majority. He has been called the
"workhorse" of the Court,9 but there is something more to his
91. BAKER, supra note 3, at 7.
92. Holmes's 90th birthday radio address has been reprinted many times. See, e.g., id.
at 5-6.
93. Id. at 34549.
94. Id. at 633.
95. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES
101 (1978). Holmes also published 30 concurring opinions and 72 dissents while on the
Supreme Court, id. at 144, and wrote many of the per curiam opinions toward the end
of Melville Fuller's term as Chief Justice in 1909 to 1910, and again when Holmes himself
was acting Chief in 1929.
96. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1910-1921, 1985 DUKE L.J.
1111, 1161.
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reputation than good luck, hard work, and the opportunity to
write a lot of opinions.
The quality of his work has several components. First was the
principal job that he did, which was to decide cases; second was
the ancillary task, to write opinions. Both Holmes's decisions and
the opinions he wrote to explain them had special qualities which
helped to account for the force of their impact. Holmes's decisions
were consistent with each other and with a coherent body of
jurisprudence and were beautifully expressed in his opinions. But
there was something further. Holmes made himself an embodi-
ment of an ideal, and this ideal of the judge, although a limited
one, was widely shared and deeply felt. Holmes projected it
through the resistant medium of judicial opinions and across
generations. This ideal, a vivid image of aristocratic American
virtue, is still what draws us to him.
IV. THE QUALITY OF HOLMES'S DECISIONS
It is difficult to get at the essence of a judge's work-his
decisions. A vote is opaque. Only a pattern of votes discloses
anything individual, and the pattern is hard to see without a
thorough knowledge, not only of the cases that were decided,
but of the aspects of the cases that were important to the judges.
But Holmes taught us that it was the judge's decisions, and not
the reasons he gave, that mattered. And so one must somehow
evaluate Holmes's judgments, more than two thousand in all.
This commentary is not the place to do that, but some examples
may be helpful. Holmes's decisions on freedom of speech are
among his best known and most important and have a number
of lessons to teach us concerning his work as a judge.
Let us begin at a little distance. Holmes wrote only a half-
dozen opinions on copyright law, and this area of law has under-
gone substantial changes since his time, yet judges still cite
several of his decisions.97 His opinion for the Court in Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.95 still defines the modicum of
"originality" required for copyright.9 9 Holmes's prescient, concur-
97. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (citing
Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)); MCA, Inc. v. Parks, 796 F.2d 200, 204
(4th Cir. 1986) (citing Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917)).
98. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
99. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1294 (1991)
(citing Bleistein).
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ring opinion in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.100
is more remarkable. The case concerned the question whether
punched-paper music rolls for player pianos were infringing "cop-
ies" of a musical composition. Seeing the case in its fundamental
aspect, Holmes judged that copyright protection should extend
to copies in any medium, even when the copy was made by new
technology and was not directly comprehensible to human read-
ers.'0' This opinion provided important arguments for securing
copyright protection for electronic databases and computer pro-
grams in the 1970's and accordingly is still good law.
In Bleistein, Holmes wrote for a divided Court,10 2 while in
White-Smith he was alone, 10 3 but no one now doubts that Holmes
had the better view in each case.
One hesitates to say that Holmes judged rightly, as if there
were some general agreement on what answers were right. Yet
my impression is that Holmes's decisions for the Court and his
dissents have a very high prestige among lawyers and judges at
least in part because they are perceived as likely to be correct.
They have a quality of intellectual authority that is difficult to
explain.
Holmes's relatively infrequent dissents do occasionally seem
clairvoyant; they have been followed more often than the majority
opinions from which he differed. While on the Supreme Court,
Holmes published seventy-two dissents and thirty concurring
opinions0 4 which were usually expressions of views that differed
from those of the Court. Roughly half of these 102 separate
opinions concerned a single broad question, one that we might
characterize as the content of the language of constitutional
guarantees of liberty; or perhaps as the degree of deference the
Court owed to other branches and agencies of government.'05 In
nearly all these cases, we would now accept Holmes's results,
rather than those of the changing Court majorities.
100. 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 20.
102. Holmes wrote for a seven-to-two majority. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248.
103. And accordingly concurred, although his reasoning pointed to a dissent from the
Court's holding that the music rolls were not protected under copyright laws. White-
Smith, 209 U.S. at 18.
104. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 95, at 144.
105. The remainder range from tax to admiralty and are difficult to characterize as a
group. Most of these opinions would be accepted as good law today, ii some cases almost
a century after they were written. Holmes was able to achieve this remarkable record
partly because he was reluctant to dissent and chose his moments. Although he wrote
more opinions for the Court than any other Justice, at least ten other Justices wrote
more dissents. See id. at 102.
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Another reason for Holmes's reputation is his faithfulness to
the principles he so often announced on behalf of the Court. His
fundamental ideas had been formed before he joined the Court,
and he rarely departed from them to secure a preferred result.
Even his decisions that have not been followed, with occasional
exceptions, are at least consistent. Holmes, for all his vindication
of the judge's legislative power, respected precedent deeply. He
occasionally overturned statutes, but he rarely voted to overrule
settled precedent, even when he believed the precedent to have
been decided wrongly. Holmes voted to reverse the precedents
of his own Court that had allowed the Postmaster General to
exercise prior restraint on the contents of letters,06 for instance,
but he was reversing only his own earlier vote. Deeply as he
disagreed with and campaigned within the Court against the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,1 7 in his most stinging dissents he did
not argue for overruling the case itself, but only for narrowing
the interpretations that had been put upon it. He expressed his
Burkean respect for the past in characteristically skeptical terms:
[W]e have a great body of law which has at least this sanction
that it exists. If one does not affirm that it is intrinsically
better than a different body of principles which one could
imagine, one can see an advantage which, if not the greatest,
at least, is very great-that we know what it is. For this
reason I am slow to assent to overruling a decision. Precisely
my skepticism, my doubt as to the absolute worth of a large
part of the system we administer, or of any other system,
makes me very unwilling to increase the doubt as to what the
court will do.10 8
Even when judges were obliged by their interpretation of the
Due Process Clause to apply substantive standards to legislation,
Holmes believed that they should consult, not their own secular
preferences, but the relatively fundamental principles discernible
in the common law itself.0 9 This was the common strand in
106. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921).
107. 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (holding that federal general common law applied in some federal
court diversity cases), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
108. Oliver W. Holmes, Twenty Years in Retrospect, Speech at a Banquet of the
Middlesex Bar Association (Dec. 3, 1902), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 154, 156 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1962)
109. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled
by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606
(1903).
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Holmes's dissents: deference and restraint. Accordingly, although
Holmes argued that judges necessarily would consult views of
social policy as well as precedent, he himself treated this as a
last resort. Judges' ignorance was the great law reformer; but
the better and more learned the judge, the less frequently he
would be thrown back on policy. Holmes regularly chastised his
colleagues for relying on their views of social policy when prin-
ciples of law might have been allowed to govern; and it is difficult
to point to cases in which Holmes himself was reduced to saying
that precedent and legal principle did not supply a rule of
decision. The only clear example of this is Olmstead v. United
States,110 in which Holmes chose as his principle of social policy,
that the government should not behave ignobly.
This relentless conservatism is visible in all Holmes's decisions,
including some we may now think wrongly decided. Perhaps the
only important opinion that seems just plain wrong by Holmes's
own criteria was Giles v. Harris,"' in which he held for a divided
Court that the Civil War Amendments did not give federal courts
authority to enforce what had been called "political" rights,
including the right of African-Americans to vote on an equal
footing with other citizens of the United States.
But most of Holmes's opinions that now may be open to
criticism were at least consistent with existing precedent and
his own general views. In United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt,"2
a case with distressing facts-a child had died in an unfenced
pool of poisonous chemicals-Holmes maintained the old rule that
a railroad company had no duty to trespassers. In Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman,"3 Holmes repeated what he had
said innumerable times on the Massachusetts bench, that a person
at a grade crossing was obliged to stop and make sure that no
train was approaching. 4 Both opinions were contributions to
110. 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
111. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
112. 258 U.S. 268 (1922).
113. 275 U.S. 66 (1927), overruled by Pokora v. Wabash R.R. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
114. See, e.g., Merrigan v. Boston & A. R. Co., 28 N.E. 149 (Mass. 1891); Johanson v.
Boston & M. R. Co., 26 N.E. 426 (Mass. 1891); Donnelly v. Boston & M. R. Co., 24 N.E.
38 (Mass. 1890). The facts in Goodman, the 1927 "Stop, look, and listen" case, were
compelling from the plaintiffs side, but the rule was not based on preference for the
railroad: Holmes had applied his rule on plaintiffs' as well as defendants' behalf in
Massachusetts. In Johanson, Holmes held that evidence the injured children had stopped
to look for a train was sufficient to overturn a directed verdict for the defendant,
Johanson, 26 N.E. at 427, and in Merrigan he held for the plaintiff, Merrigan, 28 N.E. at
150.
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"sound learning," according to Frederick Pollock, Holmes's men-
tor in the common law.115
In Bailey v. Alabama,16 Holmes said he would have upheld an
Alabama statute that set criminal penalties for violations of labor
contracts and that had been used to create a form of peonage
for African-Americans. 117 Holmes's argument was that the Thir-
teenth Amendment, prohibiting involuntary servitude, was, like
other provisions of the Constitution, to be construed in light of
the common law."18 In Massachusetts he had upheld the consti-
tutionality of imprisonment for debt,1 9 and he could see no basis
for saying that the former slave states were subject to funda-
mental legal principles that did not apply in the northern states.
Baker's discussion of this case is particularly interesting. Like
most modern commentators she is critical of Holmes's dissent. 120
She rightly suggests, however, that Justice Hughes's opinion for
the majority, asserting that the statute in question would be
struck down in New York as in Alabama, was disingenuous. 21
The Court's opinion was result-oriented; its real aim, which Baker
approved and in an odd way I think Holmes did also, was to
further the reconstruction of the South. Holmes was glad that
statesmen like Hughes and White, who weighed policy questions,
were on the Court. For himself, however, he could not vote, even
to banish the peonage that he had so nearly given up his life in
fighting, unless he could find a frank basis in law for his decision.
This judicial conservatism poses a conundrum. What is great-
ness in a conservative judge? By definition he makes no inno-
vations. He holds himself bound by precedent, and so far as
possible sets aside everything that is merely personal or tem-
porary when making his decision. The passage of time will oblit-
erate his decisions, bound as they are to the past. Judges like
John Marshall and Benjamin Cardozo are known for their inno-
vations, for their willingness to use legal materials to arrive at
results dictated by social policy. Holmes in his scholarly writings
certainly justified their work. But Holmes as a judge set a
different standard for himself. His devotion to his craft, and his
temperamental conservatism, closed off the opportunity for great-
ness in this sense; in his opinions, he announced no new principles
115. Frederick Pollock, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 693, 695 (1931).
116. 219 U.S. 219 (1910).
117. Id. at 245 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 246-49.
119. In re Brown, 53 N.E. 998 (Mass. 1899).
120. BAKER, supra note 3, at 443-46.
121. Id. at 446.
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of tort or contract law, and even in constitutional law was as
deferential to precedent and the legislatures as it was possible
to be. This conservatism led Holmes's admirer, Morris R. Cohen,
himself a proponent of reform, and writing at the height of an
era of reform, to make this assessment of Holmes's place in
history:
[H]e has not so far exerted any highly effective influence on
the law and life of our country. He has not, like Marshall or
Taney, changed the current of our constitutional law, nor for
that matter has he left any permanent impress on any other
branch of our law, as lesser men, like Story, did in admiralty
or conflict of laws. Holmes was a lone, though a titanic figure,
and the currents of our national life have swept by and around
him.'22
Yet lawyers and judges admire Holmes now, not for his char-
acter alone, but for his qualities as a judge. The conservatism
itself is not very unusual, nor is Holmes's rigorous consistency.
Justice Edward Sanford, to take one example, was rigorously
consistent and faithful to precedent, without being very much
celebrated now.
In addition to all the other factors that contributed to Holmes's
reputation, one is fundamental and concerns the substance of the
ideal to which he was faithful. Holmes touched on this in his
First Amendment opinions. In his famous dissent in Abrams, for
instance, he said that government rested on truth and that truth
was to be determined by the competition of the marketplace. 12
Government was not to intervene by force into the rivalry of
ideas.
Holmes had a characteristic Malthusian argument on behalf of
this theory of the First Amendment, but I should say that what
carries across the generations is not his hard-minded, faintly
crackpot, evolutionism-his notion that free speech had survival
value. What we admire is Holmes's submission to a dignified and
bleak sense of duty. He spoke most truly and most spontaneously
in his first free speech opinion, the unpublished dissent in Baltzer:
It is better for those who have unquestioned and almost unlim-
ited power in their hands to err on the side of freedom. We
have enjoyed so much freedom for so long that perhaps we
are in danger of forgetting that the bill of rights which cost
so much blood to establish is still worth fighting for. 24
122. Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holms, 82 NEw REPUBLIC 206 (1935).
123. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
124. Novick, supra note 59.
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"It is better," not wiser or more prudent or more progressive;
only better. For a moment the reality of the man comes through,
and we acknowledge being touched in a way that is not easy to
articulate.
A great judge, it appears, is one who reaches down to a
fundamental insight, one to which later judges will recur, not
necessarily for doctrine, but for reassurance. In this still obscure
but profound sense we feel Holmes's decisions were more often
right than those of other judges.
V. HOLMES'S OPINIONS
However high the quality of Holmes's judgments, we should
have known nothing about them if they had not been embedded
in memorable opinions. In this sense, Holmes's place in history
depends on his qualities as a writer of opinions. Here again,
Baker has little to say. She devotes a couple of paragraphs to
Holmes's style, in which she says that he tried to be brief and
valued niceties like the distinction between "shall" and "will.' 25
She makes the important point that Holmes wrote his opinions
to be read aloud and took care to make them sound well,126 but
she goes on to explain that they were often obscure, and I do
not think that on balance she likes them.
Others have said that Holmes's opinions are so often cited
simply because they are well written.'12 This is a somewhat
belittling explanation. As a prose stylist, Holmes's accomplish-
ment seems to me modest and hardly adequate to account for
his reputation. Of course he wrote very well for a judge, who
must put other considerations foremost; but this is not very high
praise. Edmund Wilson ranked him with Walter Pater, a minor
Victorian author;1 and this estimate seems just. It is an impres-
sive accomplishment in a judge but hardly seems adequate to
account for his towering reputation.
Holmes's style is certainly notable. He brought the precision
of classical forms to the rhythms of American speech. Speaking
of the "dirty business" of illegal wiretapping by government
agents, for instance, Holmes said that evidence obtained by this
means should not be allowed in court:
125. BAKER, supra note 3, at 380.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
281-89 (1988).
128. EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE 781 (1962).
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If [the Government] pays its officers for having got evidence
by crime I do not see why it may not as well pay them for
getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to
protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays
and announces that in future it will pay for the fruits. We
have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play
an ignoble part.12
The compact density of meaning in this passage depends on
precise contrast of verb tenses-"for having got. . . for getting,"
"pays . . . will pay"-which is an echo of the Latin poetry men
of Holmes's generation memorized and learned to write. These
classical structures, in which Holmes displays like little gems his
informal vocabulary and his colloquialisms -"dirty business," "I
do not see," "it may as well," "I can attach no importance," "I
think"-make for easy, personal, and frank talk of high precision.
It is a style that is Holmes's own, a synthesis of table-talk and
the oral opinions of English judges. It is not an easy style, and
Holmes's opinions, dense and aphoristic, are difficult to follow,
but in their own way they are perfect.
To have an original style, and to write as well as Walter Pater,
is something; no other American judge has merited appraisal by
a critic of Wilson's stature, let alone merited ranking among the
minor Victorian writers. Still, it is for the larger perspective his
writings open, and not for his style, that we remember Holmes.
This is as Holmes would have wished. As he wrote to a close
friend in 1911, when he felt at the peak of his form:
[T]he thing to aim at is to see and feel as much as one can the
great forces behind every detail-a wavelet of the Atlantic
Ocean is different from one of Buzzard's Bay. Therefore after
a man has a working knowledge of his job-at least if he is a
judge-I would advise him not to be eternally reading late
cases but to let in the streams of philosophy, sociology, history,
economics, etc. etc. I guess it tells. I was more pleased than I
can say by a letter on my 70th birthday from our leading law
writer quoting a French remark.., and applying it to my
decision-that he had one foot on the finite and the other on
the infinite. It pleased me that anyone should see my intent-
to look at the particular in the light of the universal.130
129. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
130. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Alice Stopford Green (June 18, 1911) (on
file at Holmes Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
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When people praise Holmes's style, I think they sometimes
have this quite different thing in mind; which is all the more
remarkable, considering the form of expression that he chose.
As Baker notes, Holmes conceived of an opinion, not as a
printed document, but as talk delivered from the bench.' 3' He
paid careful attention both to the writing and to his style of
delivery, to ensure their impact. When Justice Sanford submitted
one of his first opinions for approval, Holmes, with the freedom
of an elder, gave him some advice: "Non obstant the effective
and powerful example of Brandeis to the contrary I don't think
opinions should be written in the form of essays with notes-
they are theoretically spoken."'13 2
The model for this form was the English judge: a gentleman
rather than a professional.
I don't believe in the long opinions which have been almost
the rule here [on the Supreme Court]. I think that to state the
case shortly and the ground of decision as concisely and deli-
cately as you can is the real way. That is the English fashion
and I think it civilized. 133
Holmes's opinions accordingly were brief and well written
enough to be read aloud, and they were written so quickly, and
with so little revision, as to seem, like the opinions of English
judges, to have been extemporized from the bench. They were
fundamentally dramatic; their impact was almost physical. This
was the quality for which Holmes strove in all his opinions, but
often was able to achieve only in dissent. In a letter to Alice
Stopford Green, the historian, Holmes talked about this aspect
of his writing:
two dissents that I wrote with gaiety of heart, in a railroad
and a telegraph case'34 that I was pleased to have decided as
131. BAKER, supra note 3, at 380.
132. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Justice Edward T. Sanford (Jan. 1, 1925)
(on file at Sanford Papers, University of Tennessee, Knoxville). I am indebted to Liva
Baker for placing a copy of this letter among the Holmes Papers at Harvard.
133. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Anna Lyman (Nina) Gray (Mar. 2, 1903) (on
file at Holmes Papers, Harvard Law School Library), quoted in NovICK, supra note 2. at
256.
134. Presumably, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 52 (1910) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) and Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 75 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The Court invalidated, as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, fees imposed
on the telegraph and railroad companies for the privilege of doing business in the state,
because the fees were based on the total capital of the companies, including their out-of-
state facilities, and were not related directly to the intrastate business within Kansas.
Holmes said a fee based on the size of the company was perfectly reasonable.
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they were, but in which I couldn't swallow the pretense at
logic of Harlan and White. If they'd just brusqu6 the thing
and said: Logic for law-school-this is business-and when a
railroad has a right to come into a state it comes in with all
its roots, I probably should have grinned and shut up. My form
of expression evidently is modelled on what I heard an actress
saying-that if she should recommend a play to Mr. Frohman
he would read it politely and return it and say "That is
literachoor -what we want is drayma."'135
Holmes's opinions often swept his colleagues into agreement
and continue to carry us along. His opinions seem to defy logical
analysis; they move us at quite another level of thought and
feeling. They convey, not just Holmes's ideas, but the force of
his personality.
The ideas and the man himself were fused by the same principle
that had led him to his form of expression from the outset: His
ideas and attitudes were those of a gentleman, what we should
now call an aristocrat. There is nothing so attractive to Ameri-
cans, so in keeping with our picture of ourselves, as a native
aristocrat-a Yankee from Olympus, in Elizabeth Sargent's in-
spired image.136 The late George Olshausen, in a perceptive ar-
ticle, accounted for Holmes's appeal by comparing him with a
"medieval knight," and compared him to de Toqueville's famous
description of the aristocratic virtues: "'[Fleudal honor .. .im-
periously commanded men to subdue themselves; it decreed for-
getfulness of self. It prescribed neither humanity nor
gentleness. . . .Foremost among virtues the nobles of the Middle
Ages put military valor. . . .' [T]he aristocracy dealt in the grand
manner with abstract ideas and theories."137
But one more element must be mentioned. Holmes was no
mere clotheshorse for traditional forms; he was an intensely
energetic, passionate man, who like other popular figures-one
thinks of Presidents Kennedy and Reagan, in their different
ways-managed to convey the grace, the ambition, the optimism,
and energy of youth. Richard Rovere summed it up nicely: "The
chivalrous assumptions, the pleasure he took in the stuff of life,
135. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Alice Stopford Green (Feb. 8, 1910) (on file
at Holmes Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
136. See Elizabeth Shepley Sergeant, Oliver Wendell Holmes, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 8,
1926, at 59, 59.
137. George G. O1shausen, Aristocratic Critic of Capitalism, AM. SOCIALIST, July 1956,
at 25, 25 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville).
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and the reaching for high C combined to give us a great jurist,
a great sage, and a gay and gallant and cheerful companion."'
1
This is the personality Holmes constructed for himself and
managed to put right through his opinions; his ideas were em-
bodied in his persona as much as in the specific words. Which is
not to say that the opinions are not also logical; with patience
and knowledge of the context one can always parse the opinions
out in logical sequence. But it is not the logic that persuades, it
is the fundamental insight transmitted in dramatic form.
Holmes, in other words, was an artist of a high order. The
careful, logical arguments were there, in the underpainting, as it
were; in the surface they were reduced to essentials. As he
described his own work:
Did I ever tell you of Corot-the painter-that I heard once
that he began as most careful draughtsman working out every
detail and came to his magisterial summaries at the end? I
have thought of that in writing opinions latterly. Whether the
brethren like it I don't know. Of course-the eternal effort of
art even the art of writing legal decisions is to omit all but
the essentials-'The point of contact' is the formula. The place
where the boy got his fingers pinched-the rest of the ma-
chinery doesn't matter. So the Jap. master puts five dots for
a hand-knowing they are in the right place. 139
His opinions indeed remind one of the paintings of Matisse, or
the poems of Wallace Stevens. They are often criticized for undue
brevity, for lack of the stepwise exposition one finds in ordinary
opinions. But Holmes's opinions transmit conviction as by an
electric current. One might apply to Holmes what Matisse said
of his own work: "When a master works simply, with broad
relationships -it is because his feeling rejects complicated things
that do not come to him directly and do not go directly to the
feelings of others. What is sometimes mistaken for a defect, for
a lack, thus becomes an essential quality."'140
Holmes is not important to us now as a great originator of
ideas, but because he expressed a part of the spirit of his country
in vivid form: In a nation that generally does not honor poets,
138. Richard H. Rovere, Sage, NEw YORKER, Apr. 6, 1957, at 145, 151.
139. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 19, 1915) (on file
at Holmes Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
140. Letter from Henri Matisse to Andr6 Rouveyre, quoted in PIERRE SCHNEIDER,
MATISSE 59 (1984).
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Holmes was our Tennyson, our Hugo, our Gorky. If he was flawed
and shadowed, still there was something great in his spirit that
we now fear to lose. And it is exactly this greatness that is
missing from Baker's book.
